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ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEX AND DEBRY BOTH AGREE THAT THIS COURT IS NOT ON A
FACT-FINDING MISSION
The Dex Brief (at p. 2) cited Burkholz v. Joyce, 972 P.2d 1235, 1236 (Utahl998)
for the proposition that:
In answering a question on certification from the district court,
we do not refind the facts; we simply answer the certified
question of law.
Burkholz citedHansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 830 P. 2d 236 (Utah 1992) which states:
This case is before the court pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure on certification from the United States
District Court for the District of Utah.
The pertinent facts are extracted from the order of certification.
Id. at 238.
DeBry fully agrees with the foregoing statements of the law.1 It is not the task of this
Court to rule on fact issues. Rather, the task of this Court is to accept the facts presented by
the Tenth Circuit; and to rule on the legal issue presented by the Tenth Circuit.

l

DeBry apologizes if its opening memorandum attempted to discuss too many
background facts.
1

POINT II
DEX RELIES ON NUMEROUS FACTUAL CONCLUSIONS AND FACTUAL
ASSUMPTIONS THAT ARE OUTSIDE THE CERTIFICATION ORDER
The Dex memorandum correctly states that this Court (Utah Supreme Court)
should rely solely on facts found within the Order of Certification. {See Point I above.)
But, thereafter, the Dex memorandum goes on to argue various factual conclusions and
factual theories that are not found within the Order of Certification (from the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals).
For example, at p. 6 of the Brief ofAppellee, Dex argues a factual theory that:
[A] directory listing without an address is best construed as a
representation that the business in question serves the
community in which it places a directory listing.
Similarly, at p. 13 of the Brief ofAppellee, Dex argues another factual theory that:
The prefix table therefore provides Qwest customers with a
complete list of prefixes in their local calling area, or the
prefixes that Qwest customers can call without incurring toll
charges.2

2

Thus Dex argues that calling prefixes in the "local calling area" has nothing to do
with geography. It means, and only means, calling prefixes "without incurring toll
charges." This argument is based in part on Newton's Telecom Dictionary. But the least
sophisticated consumer, or even the average consumer, is not acquainted with that
dictionary. In fact, a recent Westlaw search of "Newton's Telecom Dictionary" in the
data base consisting of all state and federal cases found only 20 cases citing that
dictionary (none in Utah), and half of those were unreported.
2

Again at p. 14 of the Brief ofAppellee, Dex argues a factual theory that:
Because the prefix of a telephone number does not represent
the physical location of the called party, by necessity there can
be no representation or designation of a geographic origin in
such advertisements.
But, all of the above is hypothetical guesswork by Dex. In summary, Dex
correctly states the proposition that this Court (Utah Supreme Court) is bound by facts as
set forth in the Order of Certification. {See Point I above.) But then Dex consistently
breaks that rule by arguing page after page after page of (supposed) factual conclusions
that were not found in the Order of Certification.
POINT III
A KEY FACT FOUND WITHIN THE ORDER OF CERTIFICATION IS
THAT 67% OF DEX CUSTOMERS ARE MISLED
DeBry's opening memorandum relied upon a survey that:
67% of Dex customers are misled where the yellow page
advertisement includes a market expansion line number, but
no address.
Brief of Appellant at p. 24. In response, Dex has argued that this Court (Utah Supreme
Court) should ignore the survey. {Brief of Appellee at pp. 19-20.) Dex's sole basis for its
argument is that the survey is inadmissible. However, there is no reason for the Tenth
Circuit Court to certify to the Utah Supreme Court the question of whether a survey is
admissible in a federal district court. Rather, that survey (that 67% of consumers are

3

misled) is specifically set forth at pp. 2-4 of the Order Certifying State Law Question as
follows:
The facts relevant to the determination of the certified
question are set forth below.
***

. . . DeBry hired a marketing research firm to conduct a
survey in the Ogden area. The survey "show[ed] that 67% of
Dex customers are tricked or misled when they see a 'Market
Expansion Line5 telephone number in their local Dex yellow
page directory with no listed address, because they believe
that the business or profession actually has a local Ogden
office." DeBry provided the results of the survey to Dex.
Since that survey (67% are misled) is specifically included in the Certification
Order, this Court (Utah Supreme Court) must now formulate its legal ruling based upon
the results of that survey. {See Point I above.)
POINT IV
WHERE 67% OF THE PUBLIC IS MISLED. A PER SE VIOLATION OF THE
UTAH TRUTH IN ADVERTISING ACT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED
Much of the background briefing in this case deals whether or how people are
misled when a market expansion line (MEL) number is listed in a yellow page
advertisement, but without an address. Thus, there are several pages of argument about
the meaning of such terms "local calling prefixes" and "local calling areas." But it is
important to note that, all of these pages on "local calling prefix" and local calling area"
are simply arguments to show whether or how the public was misled. Nevertheless, the
4

certification order from the Tenth Circuit goes beyond the question of whether or how the
public was misled. Rather, the certification order is based upon the factual reality that
the public was misled.
67% of the Dex customers are tricked or misled when they see
a 'Market Expansion Line9 telephone number in their local
Dex yellow page directory with no listed address, because
they believe that the business or profession actually has a
local Ogden office.
Order Certifying State Law Questions at pp. 3-4.
Therefore, the legal issue before the Court is very narrow. Specifically, is the Utah
Truth in Advertising Act3 violated where an advertising program misleads 67% of the
public. The answer is that where 67% of the public are misled, there has been a, per se
violation of the Truth in Advertising Act. Per se violations of consumer protection acts
have been defined as follows:
Most of this section will analyze how practices fall
within the broad, expansive definition of "deception."
However, certain specific practices are per se deceptive. That
is, if the practice is within certain guidelines, it is
automatically deceptive . . . .
Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices, National Consumer Law Center (5th ed.) at f
4.2.1

3

Utah Code Ann, § 13-11 a-1 etseq.
5

One of the cases cited4 in support of this principle is Pack & Process, Inc. v.
Celotex Corp., 503 A.2d 646 (Del. Sup. 1985). The Pack case stated that once summary
judgment has been denied on a common law fraud claim, "it seems axiomatic that a
motion for summary judgment on a statutory fraud claim shall also be denied." For one
thing, unlike common law fraud, the Consumer Fraud Act does not require proof of
"actual reliance by the plaintiff."5
Section 13-lla-3(l)(t) of the Utah Code Ann. states:
Deceptive trade practices occur when . . . [a] person engages
in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of
confusion or of misunderstanding.
Obviously, if 67% of the population is misled, there is " . . . a likelihood of confusion or
of misunderstanding." Therefore, there has been a per se violation of the Act.
POINT V
THE ETHICAL RULES OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
WERE OFFERED ONLY FOR ANALOGY
DeBry's opening memorandum cited American Bar Association Model Rule 7.2 to
the effect that:

*Id. at U 3.2.4 n.28.
5

Id. at 657-658.
6

Any communication made pursuant to this Rule shall include
the name and office address of at least one lawyer or law firm
responsible for its content.
Dex responds by arguing that such disciplinary rules are not binding on Dex. {Brief of
Appellee at p. 22). DeBry agrees. Such disciplinary rules are binding on lawyers - not
Dex. Further, DeBry does not claim that a violation of the ABA ethical rule creates any
civil liability against Dex. Rather, the ABA Rules were cited only by analogy.
Specifically, a sophisticated governing body (viz. the American Bar Association) has
reached a factual conclusion that such conduct (viz. listing an MEL telephone number but
no address in a yellow page ad) is misleading. This Court is not bound by the ethical
application of the ABA rule. However, this Court might (by analogy) be persuaded by the
factual reasoning that led up to the the ABA rule.6

6

This reasoning is found in ABA Reporter's Explanation of Changes to Model
Rule 7.2: "Because . . . lawyers frequently advertise in locations where they do not
maintain an office, the Commission has added a requirement that each advertisement
include an office address for the law firm or lawyer named in the advertisement. This
information . . . will provide prospective clients with important information about where
the lawyer or law firm is located - an important fact in this era of multi-jurisdictional
advertising."
7

POINT VI
RECENT CASELAW FROM THIS COURT (UTAH SUPREME COURT)
CONFIRMS THAT DEX IS NOT PROTECTED BY A FILED TARIFF
The Certification Order from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also asks
" . . . whether Defendants are exempt from liability under Utah Code Ann. § 13-1 la5(1)."7
Both parties have briefed that issue; however, a very recent case from this Court
(Utah Supreme Court) is on point. The case of Utah Division of Consumer Protection v.
Flagship Capital, 2005 UT 76, 538 Utah Adv. Rep. 50, was decided November 8,2005.
In Flagship, the Utah Department of Consumer Protection brought an action
against Flagship Capital based upon a violation of Utah law. The trial court reasoned that
the Utah statute had been preempted by a federal statute; and based thereon, the trial court
dismissed the case. This Court (Utah Supreme Court) analyzed the issue of preemption
based upon the United States Supreme Court case of English v. General Electric Co., 496
U.S. 72, 79, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1940) which states:
[I]n the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is
pre-empted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress
intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively.
Such an intent may be inferred from a "scheme of federal

7

Section 13-1 la-5(l) provides that the Utah Truth in Advertising Act does not
apply to "conduct in compliance with the orders or rules of, or a statute administered by, a
federal, state, or local governmental agency[.]"
8

regulation . . . so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it," or where an Act of Congress "touch[es] a
field in which federal interest is so dominant that the federal
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws
on the same subject."
Based upon English v. General Electric, supra, this Court (Utah Supreme Court)
analyzed the claims in Flagship as follows:
Close examination of the Utah laws shows that they are
not in conflict with the TCP A, nor do they stand as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and full objective of federal
law. We see no reason why telemarketing companies would
be unable to comply with both the Utah laws and federal
statutes.
***

The telemarketing standards set by our legislature are stricter
than, but do not directly conflict with, the federal standards.
A telemarketer who complies with the Utah standards will
have little difficulty complying with the federal standards.
2005 UT 76, f22, 538 Utah Adv. Rep. 50.
Dex argues that: "Qwest5s MEL tariff* does not require that advertisements
include an advertiser's physical address." Brief of Appellee at p. 18.9 However, Flagship

Exchange and Network Services Tariff ^ 5.4.4.B.5.
9

Dex's argument that the tariff occupies the entire field of restricting misleading
advertising leads to the preposterous suggestion on page 23 of its Memorandum: "[I]f the
Commission believed that such advertisements may be deceptive, then it would have
required Qwest to amend its MEL tariff to require that the 'free listing in the White and
Yellow Page directories covering the exchange in which the MEL CO is located' include
9

squarely answers the question. Specifically, an advertiser could easily comply with the
federal statutes (regarding the filed tariff) and still comply with the Utah Truth in
Advertising Act by requiring an address in all yellow page ads that include a Market
Expansion Line telephone number.
POINT VII
DEX'S DEFINITION OF A "LOCAL CALLING AREA" IS ABSURD
DeBry has argued at Point IV, above, that it is no longer necessary to present
arguments on whether or how people are misled. If the court agrees with Point IV,
above, it will not be necessary for the Court to read the following Point VII which deals
with that issue of whether and how people are misled.
DeBry's opening memorandum relied on p. 61 of the 2004 Qwest Dex telephone
directory for Ogden which states:
The prefix(es) listed beside your community [Ogden]...
represent your local calling area . . . .
(317, 332, 334, 338, 340, 387, 392, 383, |394 395, 398, 399,
409, 436, 452, 457, 459, 469, 475, 476, 479, 528, 605, 612,
620, 621, 622, 624, 625, 626, 627, 629, 640, 648, 650, 659,
670, 681, 689, 697, 720, 729, 730, 731, 732, 737, 740, 749,
751, 752, 760, 761, 778, 781, 782, 786, 866, 881, 917)
(Emphasis added.)
a physical address." Implicit in this suggestion is Dex's acknowledgment that the tariff
does not specifically address paid advertising of MEL telephone numbers, the advertising
that formed the basis of this case.
10

Thus, DeBry argued that, when an Ogden resident sees a 394 prefix, the Ogden resident
reasonably believes that he is looking at a telephone number of an Ogden business or an
Ogden resident. {Brief of Appellant at pp. 16-21.)
The opposing memorandum of Dex responded to this argument by relying on Utah
Administrative Code § R746-347-2(C) which defines a "local exchange area" as:
A geographic area used by a local exchange carrier to furnish
and administer telecommunication services in accordance
with its local exchange service tariffs. It may consist of one
or more contiguous central offices . . . . (Emphasis added.)
Dex then relies on its Tariff on file with the Utah Public Service Commission
which states:
The term "Local Calling Area" which includes Extended Area
Service (EAS) points, denotes a geographic area . . . in which
an end user . . . may complete a call without incurring MTS
charges. (Emphasis added.)
Brief ofAppellees at p. 11; Qwest Access Services Tariff % 2.6.
According to this theory, when an Ogden resident sees a 394 prefix, that might
indicate a person or business located in Ogden; or in some contiguous geographic region
such as Salt Lake City. The problem is that Dex's own conduct belies the above
argument. Three examples are listed below:
1.

On p. 16 of the 2004-2005 Salt Lake City Dex directory is an advertisement
for City Connections Indoor Advertising. The telephone number is 355-

11

2489. (355 is a Salt Lake City prefix). No address is listed. But a phone
call to 355-2489 rings at the company headquarters in Little Rock,
Arkansas.
2.

On p. 220 of the 2004-2005 Salt Lake City Dex Directory is an
advertisement for A : l Signature Bail Bonds. The telephone number is 5350088. (535 is a Salt Lake City prefix). No address is listed. But a phone
call to 535-0088 rings at the company headquarters in Albuquerque, New
Mexico.

3.

On p. 1237 of the 2004-2005 Salt Lake City Dex directory is an
advertisement for Associated Bag Company. The telephone number is 5322040. (532 is a Salt Lake City Prefix). No address is listed. But a phone
call to 532-2040 rings at the company headquarters in Sparks, Nevada.

The point is that the companies listed above all purchased a Market Extension Line
(MEL) with a Salt Lake City prefix (355 or 535 or 532). But it is totally absurd to argue
that Little Rock, Arkansas; or Albuquerque, New Mexico; or Sparks, Nevada are
somehow "contiguous" to Salt Lake City, Utah. It is also absurd to argue that Little
Rock, Arkansas; or Albuquerque, New Mexico; or Sparks, Nevada are all within the same
"geographic area" as Salt Lake City.

12

The reality is that the Market Extension Line (MEL) is a marketing gimmick. Dex
makes extra money by selling advertisements in the Ogden or Salt Lake City telephone
directory. If the advertiser is in Little Rock, Arkansas or Albuquerque, New Mexico, the
advertiser can list a Salt Lake City phone number [MEL] without an address to trick Salt
Lake City customers into thinking.that they are calling a local Salt Lake City business.10
CONCLUSION
This Court should inform the Tenth Circuit that the defendants did indeed violate
Utah Code Ann. § 13-1 la-3(l)(b), (d), or (t) when they published in their 2003-2004
Ogden-area telephone directory a table of numerical prefixes associated with "a local
calling are" and advertisements by third parties that include a market expansion line
telephone number without any physical business address; and that defendants are not
exempt from liability under Utah Code Ann. § 13-lla-5(l).
This answer follows from the facts set forth in the Order of Certification. Those
facts govern this matter, not Dex's factual assertions and conclusions. The facts in the
Certification Order show that 67% of the public were misled. That certainly evidences
conduct which created a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding, contrary to the

l0

Actually, City Connection Indoor Advertising and A-l Signature Bail Bonds, and
Associated Bag Company could have each listed a toll free 1-800 number so that
customers could call without a charge. But customers would then realize that the 1-800
listing was a long distance call to another city.
13

Utah Truth in Advertising Act. The Flagship case and other caselaw show that the Truth
in Advertising Act is not preempted by the tariff, a tariff that did not even address
misleading advertising.
DATED this / "~ day of
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, 2005.
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Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant

Lynn P. Heward
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